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ABSTRACT
Hablar del “sujeto” y de la “ética” hoy debe partir de un lugar diferente o de un no-lugar que comprenda al sujeto 
en su devenir y transformación, identificándolo para reconocerlo, concibiéndolo como un sujeto en tránsito, 
un sujeto nómada, que puede ser reinventado en un ejercicio ético que sea reflejo de sí mismo y de sí misma, 
sin olvidar su constante encuentro con el otro.  Este artículo de reflexión pretende hacer una comprensión y un 
recorrido por los desarrollos éticos, acercándose a una genealogía de los mismos. Asimismo, intenta relacionarse 
con la construcción de la subjetividad desde lo íntimo, lo público y lo privado, como modos de acción de lo 
ético en el sujeto y finalmente reflexionar sobre las transposiciones de una ética nómada dentro de las múltiples 
diásporas que permiten una visión de la ética moderna y la posibilidad en la configuración de los sujetos y 
sus subjetividades.  Esta reflexión logra concluir que la ética está siempre en gestación y reconfiguración en 
función de las nuevas exigencias de un sistema global, como forma de poder que fomenta la resistencia como 
forma de transposición de los dispositivos éticos que configuran los comportamientos y hábitos de los sujetos. 
Keywords:
Ethics
Subjectivity
Politics
Practice
RESUMEN
Speak of the “subject” and “ethics” today must start from a different place or a non-place that understands the 
subject in his becoming and transformation, identifying him to recognize him, conceiving him as a subject 
in transit, a nomadic subject, which can be reinvented in an ethical exercise that is reflective of himself  and 
himself,  without forgetting his constant encounter with the  other.  This article of reflection aims to make an 
understanding and a journey through ethical developments, approaching a genealogy of it. Similarly, it tries to 
relate to the construction of subjectivity from the intimate, the public and the private, as a modes of action of 
the ethical in the subject and finally  reflect on the transpositions of a nomadic ethic within multiple diasporas 
that allow a vision of modern ethics and possibility in the configuration of the subjects and their subjectivities. 
This reflection manages to conclude that ethics is always in gestation and reconfiguration depending on the new 
demands of a global system, as a form of power that encourages resistance as a way of transposing the ethical 
devices that shape the behavior and habits of the subjects.
1. Introduction
Ethics etymologically, it is derived from the 
Greek word ethos, which means “custom” and aims 
to give value in the act of human beings, that is, 
judges and values within qualifiers well or badly 
the behavior of men and women, thus framing 
the action from normality without possibility of 
deviation, therefore ethics has a close relationship 
with the Moral understood this as the practical and 
concrete aspect of the norms that man formulates 
and are accepted by society, his  material object 
being human customs and behavior.
Therefore, in the genealogical and ethical 
journey, it is important to relate the poems of the 
homeric world that allude to the heroes, insofar as 
they raise the sanctioning elements and the teachings 
of these sanctioning actions. Some of them such as 
the Iliad, the Odyssey and Troy, of which it is not 
about reflection, but the works and performances 
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of men, since through these first poems it begins to 
give the reconstruction of a first fabric of what is the 
ethos.
For Plato ethics is based on “virtue as knowledge 
and that it can be learned” (Diaz and Negrete, 2011, 
p. 23), that knowledge must be geared towards 
finding happiness (the supreme good - God), the 
calm of the soul and the development of personality 
and all this  is acquired to the extent that acting is 
socially acceptable.
Otherwise, Agamben (2011) proposes that good 
must be given from works in a collective space arising 
from practice, proposing a formula with 3 elements: 
praxis + bien + polis = Coexistence. Aristotle 
wondered what is the purpose that human beings 
should seek in the world: happiness, then ethics is 
a reflection on human action in search of freedom 
and for this we must try to develop the virtues, that 
is, the habits that help vi vir better. These virtues are 
situated in the world of human action.
Since the ethics of Nicómaco(De Aquino, 
Mallea. and Mendoza, 2001)  the bet is a “Telos” 
(end), where an end, is an object work, it is a work 
of itself, which involves a series of repetitive actions 
that become habits that form a character, in Christian 
terms would call personality, but that for the current 
terms will be the constitution of a subjectivity, that is 
to say a constitution of itself as far as the truth I want 
to assume for me (Gamboa, Pérez and Izquierdo, 
2012). Then between the end that is happiness and the 
constitution, there appear means (honours, pleasures 
and wealth), allow to attain happiness, but when the 
means become in short, the end is forgotten, at that 
moment the constitution of itself is lost as the subject 
of my constitution itself. 
Another historical aspect or moment is the 
ethics of Christianity, which seeks to modify 
behaviors through its morality, transmitted by the 
commandments of God, to comply with the rules of 
the church. It is also mentioned in this medieval period 
that St. Augustine raises three types of morality, the 
social (the themes of the church), politics (the way 
in which the Roman Empire exercises the will of the 
people) and the moral of humanity. 
The source of morality is aimed at the 
construction of a city of God, the subject will live in 
terms of the search for a good placed in God, which 
he only knows through sacred writing that ends up 
being the guiding object of the behavior of human 
behavior, that behavior the subject will know him 
through catechesis and the priest as a pastor who 
orders “his” flock, giving rise to a key element that is 
confession, which puts the subject to confess before 
another who has a power , power that allows him to 
deliver him from sin (Martinez, 2010, p. 43).
This medieval period organizes the subjects in 
space but also in time. Moral construction involves a 
theocentric construction, this is how the renaissance 
era is a break from medieval thought in terms of 
modern science, where the Aristotelian idea that the 
world is written in mathematical codes reappears 
and appears the idea that man is god on earth man is 
the measure of all things (Agamben, 2011).
Meanwhile, Protestant ethics, martin Luther 
appears who criticizes religious morals, adding that 
the use of men’s morals is to seek to be righteous, 
while for John Calvin the moral life is a pure and 
holy action (Agamben, 2011). Martin Luther, on 
the other hand, proposes a reform of the Catholic 
Church as the only custodian of the faith, as the 
only valid interpreter of sacred scripture concerning 
the sacraments of the priesthood and confession. If 
sacred scripture is what says how I should direct my 
action then I can read the Bible, that implies that now 
it is “I” who can interpret my action and behavior 
in terms of the Bible and know what god’s will is , 
therefore can now be directed as an individual, this 
implies a rupture in morality. 
On the other hand, Machiavelli appears, who 
makes a reflection on politics and the state. It 
places religion according to politics, morality is 
incorporated as part of politics and power, and the 
church becomes an institution of state power, ruled 
by a monarchy. Machiavelli begins to show that 
politics is no longer the pursuit of the common good 
as was the case in the Greek world “the ideal of ethics 
and politics”, politics then, at this time has become 
the art of staying in power and how to govern others 
(Agamben, 2011).
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Thus, the moment of reason as a source of 
morality in the modern age, is given the so-called 
Kantian ethic, in which Imanuel Kant, exposes, 
“Criticism of practical reason” and “Foundation 
of the metaphysics of customs”, there, proposes 
that every ethic must be formal, that is, it must be 
universal and rational, valid for everyone, it should 
not say that it is what we should do, but we must act. 
Another aspect of kantian ethics enunciated by 
Martínez (2010), is the concept of the moral value of 
an action, which lies in the motive that determines 
it, with a maxim that it poses, works in such a way 
that your behavior can be taken as a universal law. 
This maxim as a categorical imperative is part of 
the good is “good will”. It is not that I propose that 
my action be universal, but that action is according 
to universal reason, that universal reason as Blanco 
(2012) would say configures of the modern subject, 
the obedient and regulated subject.
However, questions remain about this ethical 
journey, such as how far can Kantiano be, when 
following the universal reason the life of another is 
put at risk?”, this opens up other ethical looks that 
break with the ideas of one reason , proposing new 
practices, situations and positions of the ethical 
subject, such as the look of the intimate public and 
the private, the ethical and political relationship 
and the Foucaulti and Rossi Braidotti proposals, 
as a conglomerate that offers different lenses of the 
ethical as subject configuration.
2. The subjective configuration between the last, 
the private and the public
Thinking about subjectivity in relation to 
intimacy brings us closer to the perspective of Pardo 
(1996), who raises that.
“intimacy is not the sum of particular preferences 
but their form, that is, their condition of 
possibility, so that this ternarying itself (...) does 
not mean firm sustenance not uncompromising 
or immovable rigidity but, on the contrary, 
designates an essential decadence” ( p.40).
Therefore, intimacy is seen as a daily experience 
of the existence that makes the subject to be on the 
brink of imbalance and balance, constant instability 
that dampens sense or better passion living, being 
the subject thrown into the world.
From this perspective delving into the seeds 
of intimacy does not imply explaining it because 
it would not make sense, you cannot impregnate 
only with denotations which is the way that some 
psychologists, sociologists and philosophers 
conceive and make use of intimacy “Intimacy does 
not it is made of sounds but of silences, we have no 
intimacy for what we say but for what we silence, 
because intimacy is what we silence when we speak” 
(Pardo, 1996, p. 55). 
Therefore,  intimacy rather than being a condition 
of language, appears as the effect of it, in what is said 
and in what is not said, intimacy is connotation rather 
than denotation, it is symbol, more than sign, it is 
meaning more than meaning. Intimacy feeds on the 
multiple interpretations it generates, as José Pardo 
(1996) would say “Intimacy does not make language 
possible – that’s what the city is for – but it makes it 
real, it confers it being. Without intimacy there could 
be language, but no one could (besides that no one 
would) want to speak it” (p. 54), and in that effect the 
subjectivity is also configured that is also expressed 
in the silence of what we silence, that is, in intimacy. 
According to the author, misconceptions are given 
around the intimacy that threatens to destroy it to the 
extent that it has been mixed with the public and the 
private.
The first fallacy: of intimacy or identity. 
Intimacy is conceived as a source of public law and 
a source of general laws, the belief in natural law of 
human beings; has meant the linguistic expression 
of this fallacy, the idea that the word always has an 
original meaning, so that all the divergent meanings 
are deviations from that law. The consequence of 
this fallacy is the ruin of intimacy by making it a law 
of obligatory enforcement, that is to say that identity 
means that I have to comply with laws and therefore 
that privacy is lost, that is confused with that having 
myself (identity) it’s not my intimacy but it’s part of 
my identity. Intimacy made identity.
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In the second privacy fallacy, Pardo (1996) 
interprets the formula: 
“man also has himself as if, himself, it were 
an attribute of the subject (private part of 
the individual), generating the confusion of 
intimacy with privacy, the consequence of the 
ruin of intimacy would be that it was conceived 
as a source of duty of compliance in the private”, 
that is to say that, “in this case intimacy is ruined 
precisely by considering it as a source of rights 
(and therefore of duties) private” (Pardo, 1996, 
p.38). 
Therefore, the linguistic expression of this 
fallacy lies in devising the intimate meaning of the 
word as if it were an explicit meaning (public but 
secret), the vice would be intimacy taken as private 
property. In this case the privacy would be taken as 
the secret, the hidden that could not be put outside. 
Intimacy is not always something secret or hidden, 
i.e. intimacy is continually explicit for the individual 
who is permanently unbalanced and has himself.
The third fallacy of ethnic cleansing or 
ineffability. He argues that intimacy is linguistically 
inexpressible: “If my intimacy is my deep and natural 
identity, which excludes other identities other than 
mine, my only possible relationship with others 
(those of a different nature than i) is violence and 
war, I can’t talk to them because, if they don’t feel 
what I feel when I say “I” we can never understand 
each other (Pardo, 1996), that if my intimacy I can’t 
communicate, it’s likely that a communication with 
the other can’t be deployed.
The fourth fallacy is solipsism, which is 
defined by brown “as the idea that intimacy is 
radically incompatible and that it is only genuinely 
experienced in the absolute solitudes and isolation of 
social life” (Pardo, 1996, p.40), hence the intimacy 
would be lived by each individual and not shared 
with the other, because if they shared with someone 
they would lose their wealth.
From all of the above, it is evidenced that 
“having itself” does not indicate identity, nature, 
possession or property but tension, imbalance and 
restlessness (Pardo, 1996), that is, that man also has 
himself by his experiences ways of walking and 
living the world, within his difficulties, hopelessness 
and imbalances; that is why from all the above 
intimacy, is not balance, rigidity, or firm in itself, but 
the constant instability and failures that occur in your 
experience with the world, from yourself. To have 
intimacy is, to lack stable supports, to have fragility, 
exhaustions, is to be supported in false.
In order to contrast the above and avoid the 
banalization in which the use of intimacy has fallen, 
Pardo (1996) also proposes axioms or principles to 
speak of intimacy:
The first Axiom “to be someone to be inclined”. 
Intimacy is not the sum of particular preferences 
but its form, that is, its condition of possibility, so 
that each one bends or lays and is of the particular 
concern of each one, his interests, searches, passions, 
desires, sensations and feelings.  This constitutes 
the possibility of feeling life, detaching itself, 
that intimacy would be what puts us in constant 
imbalance, which leads to no absolute truths since we 
are always in imbalance by the different inclinations 
that are continually given. 
The second Axiom “Intimacy, is the specifically 
human animality”. It refers to this “is as own as its 
rationality.” Man is not an animal because he expresses 
his emotions directly, immediately or brutally, nor 
because he encauses them by channels previously 
established by genetic or intrinsic patterns. The man 
feels his emotions, that is, the “hears ringing in that 
fold or interior in which he harbors himself, feels the 
bend or curvature through which his upright walk 
is always in unstable balance” (Pardo, 1996, p. 43). 
Here, the intimate is interpreted as the part 
that characterizes the human being from the ability 
to listen internally, to hear the voices that each has 
within himself, or otherwise by way of comparison, 
“it is like the dark side of the heart when the poet 
finds the  closet and is “the same” and several voices 
or personalities emerge” (Blanco, 2012), so it is 
considered to be there, where the emergence of new 
technologies that try to balance that imbalance in one 
way or another is given, since other technologies have 
been imposed that are apparently those of the “I” and 
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that each assumes them himself , or as hypotheses 
those that are already given by biopolitical elements 
of control, which are so internalized in the subjects 
who believe them as their own. (Martínez, 2010). 
The third Axiom Pardo (1996) states: “I stand by 
leaning on my inclinations” puts it as:”They are not 
only my ruin or doom, but also what makes me have 
myself, my guts and, therefore, what makes there are 
things that are endearing to me that can be endearing 
to someone”(p. 45). In this axiom there is a knowledge 
and recognition of my entrails, and consequently in 
contact with each other through the various ways of 
seeing the world through communication, that is, the 
recognition of one’s limits of freedom and how far 
do these (chasms of doom), where the way to sustain 
themselves arises. Thus, by experimenting with one’s 
own limits, inclinations, perversions, it is possible to 
self-compression to know how to master and learn to 
move recognizing the possibility of falling.
In this way, according to Martínez (2010) the 
questioning of how through these perversions can 
also generate domination to the other, taking up the 
statement made by Foucault, in relation to how in 
the practices of freedom an exercise in action on the 
other, not as an exercise of domination but how the 
other can resist, to the extent that the other has the 
freedom to decide, being the limits where the other 
is aware that what he does, in that sense implies my 
limits as the possibility of recognizing the limits of 
The other.
The fourth Axiom “Unconfessable Inclinations” 
Pardo (1996) states that: “My tastes and without 
flavors give me life, because they make me feel that 
I lose it, that I escape without me being able to do 
anything to retain it: those cries are the unconfessable 
inclinations (...) who reveal to me the mystery of my 
mortality, the truth of my own life, the truth of my 
own death”.(p. 49). In this way the subject goes to 
his limits is known, and from there develops the life 
and feeling of each subject.
The fifth Axiom “The Intimate Truth of My Life 
Is His Falsehood”, Pardo (1996) defines it as: “The 
falseness of my identity (I have myself, but I am not 
myself, I am not identical to myself) or my lack of 
nature. But all my concrete and unique weaknesses, 
beyond their moral evaluation, find their reason for 
being, their source, and their status of possibility in 
that essential weakness of my life. (p. 49). In the 
meantime, it can be pointed out that, the subject is 
nothing, to the extent that it has nothing defined, 
since it is always in constant construction.
The sixth Axiom  “Having intimacy is not being 
able to identify”,  Pardo (1996) refers to intimacy 
as what prevents us from being identical, “to have 
intimacy is not to be able to identify with nothing. 
(...), I have no intimacy because I know who I am, 
but because I am the one for whom the meaning of 
the question Who am I never exhausted?” (p.50). In 
this way intimacy is understood as one that prevents 
us from being equal beings to others, that is to say 
that there is no identity but a continuous search for 
oneself.
In this way, in order to recognize the 
relationship between intimacy and subjectivity, it is 
stated that misunderstandings related to the intimate 
refer to the confusion of intimacy with privacy, 
which is necessary to undo. Delving into two 
misunderstandings, the first; he calls it the confusion 
of the private with the intimate, with these the first 
aporia: the private refers to the public.
In the meantime, the public is not the sum of 
private interests, since it cannot be total, that is, if 
everything is public nothing is, because it would 
give a totalitarian meaning, and the public alone is 
so, when its self-restriction constitutive , gives rise to 
the private, because it has to give part to the private 
and in turn by being public in the strict sense.
Intimacy is the experience of the public, they 
are not simply categories that relate as if they were 
separate entities, the public is one of the scenarios 
in what emerges significances and in which we put 
the interpretations that we elaborate in between 
ourselves or between us, like this:
intimacy is seen as the nudity of those who have 
no home, as vulnerability, in front of the other, 
condition of those of us who do not have a place 
of their own, which causes a second aporia to 
arise accordingly, in which one cannot speak of 
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the intimate without referring to the common 
(Pardo, 1996, p.58).
For her part, Paula Sibilia defines intimacy as 
something that has a hidden meaning, protected 
by physical barriers such as the house called as 
private space and by moral barriers such as modesty, 
decorum and rectum, to expose her proposal of 
extimity and to talk about extimity, is to expose 
intimacy, to make public, intention that is linked to 
the different technological changes that have taken 
place in recent times, which causes a mistrust in the 
fact that there is a true intimacy (2008). 
In this way social networks become the clearest 
show of extimity, to the extent in the “I” is defined 
by the look of the other, because nowadays it is 
essential to specify that I exist, because if I am alone 
and no one sees me , I have no guarantee that I 
exist” therefore the subject becomes a protagonist to 
exhibit, that is, that the subject is in constant change 
and can be another in different spaces and times, 
as a timely terrain to experiment and design new 
subjectivities (Sibilia, 2008). The author proposes 
that current subjectivity produces extimity where 
there was intimacy. Interiority has ceased to be the 
core of the truly human; what was written yesterday 
in an intimate journal is exposed today, on the web, 
to the obscene look of the whole. The model of the 
inner life is in crisis: the supposed truth of being was 
encrypted in that contact with one’s own interiority, 
where modesty and secrecy dominated the scene, 
but today the stage is the screen where life is offered 
to the public , as a spectacle: it remains to know 
what happens to the one who observes, consumes 
and enjoys that public exposure of the other, both 
socially, individually and at the level of couples.
Thus, a first statement of Intimacy as a spectacle 
since Sibilia (2008), is the show of the self, which 
explains how the most influential media such as the 
Magazine Time, decide to make the small, ordinary 
and every day of ordinary people, defining the 
character of the year, “you”, being the media (the 
internet), the mechanisms that promote the creativity 
of subjects for commercial purposes.
As a second statement the author expresses that 
he, i narrator and life as a story, it means that when 
the subject narrates or exposes his life to the different 
alternative means of communication, putting on a 
show of himself, exhibiting an invented intimacy, 
where their testimonies are false or not authentic, 
making a creation of the other self, which is not 
their self, so, that the meaning of the public and the 
private and the historical conceptions by which they 
have been traversed, according to Sibilia (2008) are 
disintegrating and demand new interpretations.
As a third aspect in terms of the private self and 
the decline of the public man; the author points out 
that:
The intimate and confessional writings demand 
ed or at least demand, the author’s loneliness at 
the time of creating them, instead, the cybernetic 
versions of these accounts of themselves, on 
the other hand they are also usually solitary 
practices, although their disposition is rather 
more ambiguous, because they are installed at 
the limit of total advertising (Sibilia, 2008, p. 
65).
This means that the person who writes, today, 
does so intimately solitary, but who then makes it 
public (a public display of intimacy), Sibilia (2008) 
proposes that, “between them thrive with incredible 
force the new modalities of writing intimate or 
extimity, but everything happens in real time: at the 
speed of the instant, which is simultaneous for all 
users of the planet”(p. 68).
Fourth, in reference to the visible and the eclipse 
of interiority, it is exemplified as, the Western world 
undergoes serious transformations that influence the 
way individuals shape their subjective experiences, 
where they seek to project intimacy in the visibility 
of the screens, being the subjectivities introdirected 
(governed from the individual interiority, the 
intimate) dissolved, to accommodate the new 
alternating configurations (governed by the others 
and these in turn by the means of modernization and 
industrialization); as models of happiness, which 
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impose a new form of modern subjectivity, of having 
to be me. 
This culture of appearances, of spectacle, and of 
visibility, indicates reasons to seek the senses of self, 
such as “exhibitionist and performative tendencies 
that fuel the persecution of an effect: recognition in 
the eyes of others and, above all, the conditioned 
trophy to be seen”(Sibilia, 2008, p. 130).
As a fifth aspect (Sibilia, 2008) refers to the 
present self and instant subjectivity, which is based 
on the fact that both the display of intimacy and the 
spectacularization of personality, are phenomena that 
denote a certain displacement, around the modern 
subjectivities are built, revealing an abandonment 
of that inner locus (intimacy), towards a gradual 
externalization of the self.
Even the various media outlets that stage, the 
spectacle of the display of intimacy, are a greed, 
about everything that can refer to the real lives, 
both present and past, since the stories circulating in 
cyberspace , they do not seek to attain immortality 
in time, such as traditional narratives, but a celebrity 
or prominence at the time, which does not seek to 
transcend by its reflection, but instant visibility.
Sixth of this analysis the author and the cult 
of personality, represents the enormous cog that 
today communicates the cultural industry that, 
first of all, is a (Sibilia, 2008, p. 179) “machine of 
showing that for a long time, it is more powerful 
than any individual work to be exhibited”. This 
gigantic exhibition and festival mechanism, with its 
commercial fuel and medium turbines, has become 
autonomous: it now works on its own and needs a 
constant but unimportant, nutrient-rich diet that is 
supplied in every season.  The interesting thing is 
to do and above all to become visible. “Today, the 
powers of work are invested in themselves, in the 
devices that govern visibility” (Sibilia, 2008, p. 180)
In this way Foucault (1998) puts it, power games 
insist on transforming the acting self into a brand, 
when the personality of the speaker in demerit is more 
valued than what is said, in line, the increase of the 
figure of the author starring in the media, minimizes 
the work in the background and comes to justify its 
absence, putting his personality and private life in 
the foreground, indicating a new variation of the 
“author function”; so the new autographic practices 
of the Internet, and the phenomena of spectacular 
personality and display of the intimacy of “anyone” 
invaded all means.
Foucault (1998), also points out that the self 
and the author today can be anyone, you, or me, 
because by the influence of the media we are now 
all the personality of the moment, since marketing 
conquers the different scenarios of life at last for 
brands, destined for the franchise, in the emergence 
or conquest of the field of vision, appearing in the 
media (realities, contests on TV, internet, Twitter, 
blog and photolog), as personalities in these media 
to be visible. Similarly, the trend seems to be 
oriented to that daily life, has more creative power 
than the fiction itself that was handled before in the 
writings, since when the author is glamorous about 
his private life, it increases the sale of his books or 
visits to websites. Meanwhile, what is now desired is 
to exhibit the intimacy of anyone.
A seventh element is the real self and the crisis 
of fiction: “When daily life is more fictionalized and 
esterified with media resources, the more in view 
an authentic, true experience is sought other than a 
staging. You’re looking for the real thing. Or at least 
something that seems so”(Sibilia, 2008, p. 220).
In modernity a demonstration is to know the 
intimacy of others, where the full rise of reality show, 
the spectacle of reality succeed, everything sells 
more if it is real; likewise the internet, is a scenario of 
this dynamic, with its spread of confessions revealed 
by a self, which insists on always being real; for the 
same reasons it has become common place to turn 
to fictional imaginaries to weave the narratives of 
everyday life, which generates a collection of stories 
that converge in the first person of the singular self.
Thus, the spectacularization of the self consists 
in transforming our personalities and lives no longer 
so private into fricted realities, which occur through 
cybernetics and popularize lives and personalities, 
between the world mediated by the real and not real, 
since through the sufferings and failures of the author 
who publishes, viewers see their own life reflected, 
71
Jorge Eliecer Martínez-Posada, Audin Aloiso Gamboa-Suárez, Alicia Inés Villa
Perspectivas, 4 (2), pp. 64-79, 2019, E ISSN: 2590-9215
constituting today frivolity and gossip seeking as a 
goal, to go beyond sales indices.
As the central thesis of this section Sibilia 
(2008) explains “that the relations between author 
and work, private life and public action, today are 
generalizing new narrative strategies, which denote 
other links between fiction and the real” (p. 224), 
itself, the same author notes that it is undoubtedly 
an interesting shift in the codes of realism: from 
those typical songs of the nineteenth century, to 
the home video clips, which are displayed on the 
internet”(p.245).
Finally, as an eighth element is the character self 
and panic to loneliness, annotating the author who
That is why an image of itself is made: so that it 
is seen, exhibited and observed to cause effects 
on others. In an increasingly efficiency-oriented 
culture, any investigation into the root causes 
is often scorned, in order to focus all energies 
on producing certain effects on the perceptual 
detachment of others(Sibilia, 2008, p. 279).
According to the postulates described, it is clear 
that the contemporary world has laid its illusory 
foundations in the culture of spectacle and visibility, 
exerting daily pressure on bodies and subjectivities, 
facing certain ways of being in the world, so that 
subjects are projected according to new codes and 
rules, so that they are “compatible with the new 
gears, sociocultural, political and economic”(Sibilia, 
2008, p. 279).
Moreover, this element of analysis allows to 
understand the gear of subjectivity, mediated by the 
control mechanisms (blogs, photologs, video logs 
and webcams, such as My Space, Twitter, Youtube, 
among others) that make themselves, believe sits 
the need to be visible and the idea of loneliness in 
terms of being recognized and seen by others within 
this cybernetic context traversed by the hidden and 
apparent logic of mercantilism.
This is ultimately based on the following 
paragraph:
 
Too often, perhaps no one looks at us What does 
it matter as then, if at some point we are good and 
beautiful, unique, singular, almost immortal? 
Or even if it’s purely common like you and me.  
If no one sees us, in this context increasingly 
dominated by the logic of visibility, we might 
think that we simply were not. Or worse than 
we don’t exist.(Sibilia, 2008, p. 298).
However, it is evident that the public space 
according to Martínez is the result of an interaction 
between games of truth, knowledge and power in 
which the subject is located, is located; that is, it finds 
a place through determinations of the demolished 
behaviors, for such interaction (2010).
In this way the subject is constituted morally 
according to the spaces, so fundamentally space is 
defined today and is a space in which the subject has 
to interact feeling also that it is separated, but also 
that it has a space , i.e. a space of its own that builds 
or that allows us to think that it has its own intimacy 
in relation to others, as Braidotti (2004) would 
say “public spaces as places of creativity reveal a 
paradox: they are fraught with significance and to 
the they are once deeply anonymous; are indifferent 
transitional spaces, but also inspiring meeting 
points” (p. 117).
Thus, public space becomes a discourse, which 
constitutes what the public means, being nothing 
more than an interaction between games of truth, 
knowledge and power; we can conclude that public 
space is nothing more than a construction, it is 
nothing more than a historical production that has 
made us think about the public.
The public space can be exemplified by a sauna 
where homosexuals are shared; in this sense there are 
a number of differences between what is intimacy to 
the body itself, where it interacts with other bodies, 
other bodies that are not yours and that are not a 
body of anyone. In this way it is possible to see how 
the public is also a construction.
The above scenario is a spatial form inaugurated 
by power relations that want to give the right place in 
the face of other human interactions, the appropriate 
place and that appropriate one understood under 
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certain logics or as Foucault would say certain 
epitomes, devices and rationalities, which organize 
what men do, then public space is presented from the 
appropriate place, a suitable place for everything. 
Today’s society has organized the places conducive 
or appropriate to certain human interactions, with the 
intention of controlling the subjects and protecting 
productivity and including them in the gear of the 
public.
It is a location of the subjects in a certain 
place so that it enters into a certain specific model 
of governmentality, which has been historically 
created; evidence of three moments the power of 
sovereignty, the power of discipline and the power 
of government; that is why one must ask about the 
space of the public and the private but also wonder 
about the space of the intimate which is nothing more 
than a discourse historically built of power relations.
But the question arises When does the individual 
become intimate? You could say that intimacy begins 
with the individual, we would have to think as a 
hypothesis, if it is with modernity that one begins to 
think of intimacy. And if we take what Paula Sibilia 
(2008) said, there is no space inside everything is 
outside because obviously the intimacy has to go 
out to the show. And there is the problem of human 
placement is where to locate the subjects.
It can be said that space is discourse but also 
physical place, organizes intimacy, constitute 
subjectivity. The subject appropriates some spaces 
and creates intimacy, this is the interesting thing 
to address if subjectivity is what I assume as truth, 
a discourse of intimacy; I assume it as a truth and 
about it I operate, that is, space of the intimate.
On the other hand, Arendt (2009), in his work 
the human condition refers that in ancient times the 
private retained his sense of the private devoid of 
the public, outside of which the being would not 
be fully human. The term intimacy was decunted 
before the Middle Ages, but with the advent of 
modern individualism it was possible to enrich 
the sense of the private by removing its feature of 
deprivation; therefore, “the modern private in its 
most appropriate function, that of protecting the 
intimate; was discovered as the opposite not to the 
political sphere but to the social sphere, with what 
is closest and genuinely related” (Arendt, 2009, p. 
49).  The moment the social invades the private the 
structures of government begin to have a function 
just like the family invading the private, and what we 
called private ceases to be private to become public.
Public according to Arend (2009), you can look 
from two perspectives in the first place means that 
everything that appears in the public can be seen and 
heard around the world, having the widest possible 
publicity. And the second look is that the public term 
means the world itself, in that it is common to all 
and differentiated from our privately-owned place. 
What makes it difficult to endure the masses is not 
the number of people or at least not in a real way, but 
the fact that among them the world has lost its power 
to group them together and separate them.
It should then be emphasized in the author’s 
planted that The public-political sphere allowed all 
citizens to be seen and heard by all and enabled a 
common sphere, distinct from the private sphere. 
This sphere was the place where men could show 
their uniqueness through discourse and action, 
therefore, the private sphere was instead governed 
by necessity; because they were deprived of the 
presence of others, then it was the place that was 
privately owned, that is, a place of its own in the 
world and it was also the place where what needed 
to be hidden remained hidden.
In the Modern Age the distinction between the 
public and the private disappears with the rise of 
society, this means for Arendt (2009), the rise of the 
domestic whole or economic activities to the public 
sphere, what happened in the home and all the things 
that ant they belonged to the private sphere, now 
they have become public interest.
So the public is what is to be shown, how 
private what is to remain hidden, the modern age that 
Arendt speaks (2009) in his rebellion against society, 
has discovered how rich and diverse the sphere of 
the occult can be under the conditions of intimacy , 
that intimacy stripped of his meaning today, turned 
into that private that gives him the right to be public 
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(information) by the relations of power, which they 
ask in return for their sacrifice, but these concepts 
or better categories will continue to be left in the 
hallways, in the corners, in the classrooms to try to 
give explanation but the true understanding is at the 
moment when we find ourselves in front of them and 
breathe us two meters from the face, at that moment 
it would be decided that both social, public, private 
or intimate is considered, when in every pore of 
existence is questioned Can privacy be held when 
you are being watched, monitored or controlled? 
Isn’t there more privacy and publicity?
3. Transitions between Ethics and Politics
Aranguren (1968) presents the relationship 
between Ethics and Politics, raising four questions 
in the face of that relationship.  The first has to 
do with political realism in which moralism is an 
idealism, and the ethical has a private sphere. There 
is no compatibility between the ethical and the 
political, therefore the aspirator to the political must 
do without the ethical. 
The second question referred to by Aranguren 
(1968) also maintains the distance between the 
conjugation of the ethical and the political, but, 
unlike the first, ethics are chosen in this one; this 
mastery of ethics is due to the repudiation of the bad 
of politics and the variants of this position which are 
represented in a minimization of the State and in the 
abstention of all political activity or, at the very least, 
the limitation to participation in it.
The third position seeks to represent the 
relationship between ethics and politics in a tragic 
way, since this relationship is mediated by the tension 
between moral demand and political demand, without 
achieving the satisfaction of both. “The ethical is thus 
lived, in politics, as an insurmountable and therefore 
tragic impossibility. Man has to be moral; he also 
has to be political, and he cannot be a political one. 
There’s no way out for him.”(Aranguren, 1968, p. 
65). 
Aranguren’s fourth position between the ethical 
and political is viewed differently from the previous 
three issues since not part of the assumption of 
“absolute impossibility”, but of “the constitutive 
problematicity of the relationship between ethics 
and politics” (Aranguren, 1968, p. 65).  Its main 
and most important characteristic is the tension that 
arises from the struggle for morality and political 
commitment, the latter seems to be the one that has 
the greatest possibility in the face of the compression 
of the relations between the ethical and the political.
The tensions evidenced in the four questions 
between ethics and politics create necessary 
tensions between morality actions and political 
representations, and create a moral awareness of 
political actions which reduces power repression 
and destruction that characterizes politics, without 
saying then that this moral aspiration that seeks the 
reduction of political power, does not produce a 
rejection by political power. 
Aranguren (1968), he also seeks through his 
work fundamentally  to highlight the role that 
politics plays in the state, he delves into the various 
modes of modern ethics that in his text he calls 
“individualistic ethics, ethics of alterity, and ethics 
of food” the author proposes a utopia of the state of 
justice, which is referred to as a state with radical 
insufficiency of ethics for good social order, this 
individualistic state has become what is often called 
social ethics.
By social ethics Aranguren (1968), he means that 
two different things must be understood in his words 
the ethics of alterity and the ethics of lightness, ethics 
of alterity since it seeks the moralization of society 
from the ethical-person, the plane of the wing, is the 
plane of objective social structures, giving rise to two 
forms of what it calls “technical institutionalization 
of the moral: the communist totalitarian state, which 
is total institutionalization, and the Welfare State, 
which is the institutionalization of the ethical-social. 
In the face of the political Aranguren  in Ethics 
and Politics, it proposes to highlight the role of 
politics and, moreover, its institutional dimension, of 
the State; the ethical trend and the political tendency 
are always manifested in tension and, often, in 
contradiction, however, the conjunction between 
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ethics and politics is imperative, hence the difficulty 
in finding the balance between ethical attitude and 
political attitude which is lost as soon as they are 
absolutized. 
Aranguren (1968), states that the role of the 
intellectual is critical and utopian and, the role 
of the politician is to be attentive to criticism and 
sensitive to utopia, he means that governing is 
something different from criticizing or dreaming; 
yet the political man, by obstinacy in performing 
the pure type of the “political animal”, would break, 
on the other hand, on the reductionist side, the state 
of balance, the unstable conjunction of ethics and 
politics in the government of human society.
4. New possibilities of ethics
Foucault and the Political Subject: Ethics and self-
care as a practice of freedom.
Foucault (1998) from the text, “the ethics 
of self-care as a reflexive practice of freedom”, 
emphasizes the practices of freedom rather than 
liberation processes as necessary for society 
and politics, necessary to define valid forms and 
acceptable existence, i.e. “freedom is the ontological 
condition of ethics: but ethics is the thoughtful 
form that freedom takes” (Betancourt, Becker, & 
Gomez, 1984). There the relationship of freedom is 
established as self-care.
Self-care is the way by which individual and 
civic freedom to some extent has been thought of as 
ethics, the Greeks stated that to conduct themselves 
well, to practice freedom properly, it was necessary 
to take care of themselves, to take care of whether, at 
the same time to know oneself, to train, to overcome 
himself; so in ancient times ethics as a reflexive 
practice of freedom, has turned in everything to the 
imperative of caring for itself, taking care of itself as 
the knowledge of rules of conduct or principles that 
are truths.
For Foucault the subject is not an essence, it 
is a form that is transformed and therefore the 
care of himself has a historical constitution that 
generates the formation of a type of subject 
immersed in real games. The practices of 
themselves constitute the subject and then a 
new ethics would be raised from playing with 
the minimum of domination that allows to base 
individual freedom (Martínez, 2010, p.72).
This is confirmed in “the hermeneutics of the 
subject” where Foucault (2005), states that “Ethics 
is the deliberate form that takes freedom”,    ethics 
is understood as an “instrument” to free the subject 
since ethics revolve around the techniques of 
subjecting, that is, to the care of self and ethics as 
self-care constitutes as an aesthetic of existence, as a 
work of art, the work of art that I myself can create 
with regard to my own existence, the care of itself , 
also implies a willingness to care for the other.
Thus, Martínez (2009) illustrates Foucault’s 
ethical gamble as a practical possibility for subjects 
from a critical perspective that surpasses modern 
essentialism:
 This critique is presented as the possibility of 
thinking about itself which discourses constitute 
the subjectivity itself to make the different 
articulations evident in the way we think, say 
and make our various ways of being. From this 
position, the subject is not something given, but 
is a way that has the possibility of continually 
modifying itself; therefore, knowing what 
discourses inhabit subjectivity is an ethical 
task (...) criticism will no longer seek formal 
structures that have universal value, rather it will 
become a historical search through the events 
that have given us led us to become subjects of 
what we do, we think, we say (p.32).
This proposes a critical work on ourselves not 
to allow others to be the sovereign of me, but this 
task is not individual, this refers to:
clarifying that self-care also implies a 
relationship with the other insofar as, in order 
to deal with it, it is necessary, at first, to listen to 
the lessons of a teacher, to guide knowledge of 
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the truth and secondly, to develop interactions in 
a group, in which the deployment of individual 
freedom takes view. (Martínez, 2010, p. 83) 
The ethics of self-care as a practice of freedom 
also require visibility into governance techniques, 
domination relations and strategic games which 
constitute forms of violation of rights and modes of 
exploitation. 
5. Transpositions on nomadic ethics
When talking about nomadic ethics, the first task 
is to understand the meaning and problematization 
that Braidotti (2009), in his work “Transpositions of 
a Nomadic Ethics” makes ethics as a transformative 
form, fmarking it within a world determined by 
mercantilism, communication technologies and 
biotechnologies, as forms of power over subjects, 
which establish their conduct and habits, as forms of 
fragmentation and dispersal. 
The Ethics for Braidotti (2009), is the discourse 
on the forces, desires and values that act as the 
empowering modes of being, while Moral is the set 
of established rules, therefore, this different way 
of thinking ethics causes the value systems with 
which we are accustomed to define ourselves, also 
invites us to map our incorporated and corporatized 
positions, where ethics must be assumed as political 
action, rhizomatic and nomadic.
In the meantime, nomadic ethics reject moral 
universalism and elaborate a different idea of 
ethical responsibility, in the sense of a fundamental 
reconfiguration of our being, in a world mediated 
by technology. It proposes the possibility of a 
sustainable ethic in relation to interconnection with 
oneself and others, implies a new way of combining 
one´s own interests with those of the well-being 
of the community; that is to say an ethic from the 
alterity, thought from the common good with the 
other, which guarantees the sustainability of ethics as 
a collective exercise. This would mean transposing 
moral debates.
Therefore, the nomadic subjectivity responds to 
the subject who is in the middle of the narratives that 
are aimed at recovering the traditional perspectives, 
unitary of the neoliberal model, in order to continue 
the passionate search for alternatives. That is, a non-
unitary subject who is at the mercy of pressures that 
drive him simultaneously in many directions. That 
is why nomadic subjectivity, “is a disputed space 
of mutations that do not obey any technological 
directive, or any moral imperative, as a fragmented 
dispersed vision” (Braidotti, 2009, p. 20).
That is why nomadic subjectivity is the way to 
identify a line of flight, something that is equivalent 
to saying an alternative and creative space of 
becoming, that does not fall between the mobile/
immobile, resident/foreign, because the question is 
not to disdain the condition of the marginal, of the 
other others, and to find a more precise and complex 
location fora  transformation of the terms of that 
political action. (Braidotti 2009).
By contrast, another element of analysis 
for the constitution of nomadic ethics is to 
transpose the difference. Where transpositions 
arise from the “becoming” that occurs from the 
social transformations induced by the market and 
technology, as an ethic that reflects the complexity 
of today’s realities.
When it comes to transposing the difference, it 
is proposed as a form of resistance from the ethical 
implications of the formulation of the oppressed 
groups sustained by a dialogical system, based on 
the idea of taking care of all as a responsibility 
collective, community and each other. The challenge 
is to “decentralize dogmatic, hegemonic and 
exclusionary power structures at the very heart of 
the dominant subject’s identity structures, through 
rhizomatic interventions; presenting a vision the 
subject that envisions changes in structures”. 
(Braidotti, 2009, p. 122).
However, the transposition seeks a new global 
ethic, in which a transformation is generated by the 
subjects, through the reconfiguration, that is to say 
loss of “disidentification” habits, which implies a 
practice of freedom, in the words of Braidotti (2009), 
it involves moving beyond pain, overcoming them is 
the ethical, that is the condition of the transformation 
of ethics.
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What is Transpose to subject?
For Braidotti (2004), the nomadic becomings, 
are the positive structure of difference, understood 
as a complex process of multiple transformations 
(Multiple becomings), a becoming refers to 
completely emptying themselves, opening it to the 
encounter with the exterior, this becomes a whole 
torrent of linked data and affectivity, which expel 
itself from the black hole of its isolation.
By transposing the subject, it becomes possible 
to transfer negative passions into positive ones, by 
drawing up suffering, bearing witness to receiving 
and containing the pain of others, and reconstructing 
ethical action through the ruins of hope. And then 
the question arises as to whether resilience is then 
a transmutation of the subject? it is said that in it 
the subject despite the pain returns to the logics of 
production, it is then proposed that resilience must 
receive, live and recognize pain and then enhance it 
without meaning that it must enter the logics of the 
market, people must have the option to choose the 
best for them.
Therefore, Braidotti (2009), aims to make 
ethics a practice of freedom, as opposed to the 
proposal of universalism that directs and establishes 
how we must all act, and is determined by structural 
parameters, while the transposition is to leave those 
structural parameters based on freedom practices, 
to go to the global, as a way of becoming against 
that moral system. What we call global is in the 
conditions of the territory, globalization leads to 
production logics, Peter Sloterdijk (2009), raises 
its opposition to these logics, and refers that global 
ethics is not a maximum of a New Yorker, it is to 
recognize conditions global response.
Therefore, the subject from this nomadic 
perspective prepares to withstand the impact of that 
afivity committed; the subject isolates or captures, a 
fact that is possible when the subject takes the form 
of a sustainable model of an affective, depersonalized 
and very receptive subject. This transposition 
mobilizes the individual ability to feel, experiment, 
process and withstand the impact of the complex 
materiality of the outside.
Spinoza also envisions ethics as a policy of 
resistance with a strong aesthetic component; 
Spinosian materialism places shared imagination 
and desires at the heart of itself (cited by Braidotti, 
2004), all passions are external and collective to the 
extent that they engage others. According to Negri 
and Hardt (2002), the crowd as a collective social 
subject that reaches its legal form in a democracy. 
This is the most revolutionary aspect of Spinoza, 
who points to the gap between the metaphysical 
structure of the subject as the freedom agent and the 
order of capitalist production.
Spinoza argues that truth has its own need and 
that freedom consists of the will to accept it; it also 
refers to affection as the most powerful knowledge 
in that it ensures the compression of one’s being. The 
affectivity is understood by Spinoza as intrinsically 
positive, is the force that tries to satisfy the capacity 
of interaction and freedom of the subject, that is the 
conatus or potential of the subject, that is, ethical 
behavior confirms, facilitates and intensifies the 
potential of the subject as the ability to express his 
freedom.
In this sense Dussel (2006), in the text “Twenty 
times political” works the concept of potentias and 
potenties, and considers this concept in political 
terms, for the political being is conceived as the one 
who knows how to obey the voice of the people. 
This conception relates to the Aymara’s orientations 
of good living and what Sloterdijk raised (2003), in 
his texts of “Spheres” where one is not one, one is 
three, his placenta, you and his soul. According to 
these claims, what modernity has done is to bring the 
individual blindfolded, unaware of the relationship 
with the whole. 
For Spinoza, this issue becomes a temporal 
dimension, an ethics of sustainability that is 
maintained through affection, which allows the 
subject to be maintained, longer or persist; then 
nomadic sustainability is defined in terms of 
becoming. Bodies are not passive entities but contain 
their own forces and try to connect with them. 
Consciousness in perspective means that the limits 
of my body are the limits of my consciousness.
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As for the policy Spinoza in Braidotti (2006), 
it is based on the relationship between freedom 
and the ethical ability to discern good from evil. 
For Braidotti the Spinocistic Ethics – deleuziana of 
nomadic subjectivity:
It does not deny the process of subjection but 
places it far from liberal individualism, from 
a vision of the collective and activity-oriented 
extreme subject. At this point there is the 
articulation of the ethical with the political, 
because in the ethical processes when the 
populations called minorities join, a subject 
transposition is generated that then represents a 
political implication, a fact that has a meaning 
important, it means, to be heard, to have another 
position, becoming a becoming in the face of 
the globalized world. (p. 208)
It should be noted then that nomadic ethics 
occur within a monistic ontology that sees subjects 
as modes of individualization within a common Zoé 
Flow. Is this kind of ethics questioned and wondering 
why a body can do in the search for active ways to 
potentialize itself through experimentation? at this 
point, the non-individualistic view of the subject 
as an entity incorporated into its means for it is 
affective and interrelated, but fundamentally social. 
The ethical question is to find a balance point, the 
historical context makes it difficult to detect the 
thresholds of sustainability to the boundary markers. 
With regard to the field of susceptibility transformer 
forces, sensitivity and availability to changes or 
transformations, in this sense Braidotti (2009), refers 
to the ability of the subject to withstand vicissitudes 
without breaking.
Braidotti (2004), closes referring to the 
question that ethical life pursues what improves 
and strengthens the subject without referring to 
transcendental values but by emphasizing the 
awareness of the interconnection of each other; 
the future processes seek to transform negative 
passions into positive passions through the power of 
a compression that no longer contends with the set of 
phallogocentric norms but is nomadic and affective.
In theprocess of transposing the subject Braidotti 
(2009), he takes memory and imagination and refers 
to Lloyd who argues that the fact that the mind and 
body can act as synchronized entities is due to the 
body’s ability to remember sensations of traces 
and experiences, even after its immediate activity 
has calmed down. The corporatized subject is also 
characterized by the ability to discern similarities 
and experiences, between different experiences 
traces and sensations, being the subject of a social 
nature the affectivity as imagination acquires an 
importance Special.
While imagination can blindly attack affectivity 
and dreams, it is also the indispensable force that 
makes human reason able to install connections and 
establish links, marks a critical lack of judgment 
resulting from existing restrictions on faculty of 
rational thought. You can read two sides of the 
Imagination the negative that has been much discussed 
that allows the creation of networks in permanent 
expansion of associations and interconnections and 
the positive allows you to self-corporatized can be 
understood as Conatus (power) and act according 
to your desire to grow and increase your degrees of 
activity.
However, being affective or affective entity 
means being connected to life and therefore being 
immersed in affections emotions and passions. Ethics 
is to understand that we share a common nature, at 
the same time the concern for the individuals around 
us and for that very reason to be able to transcend 
self-interest by caring for others.
In this way an ethic of sustainability is based 
on temporality and persistence, which is equivalent 
to saying a nomadic compression of memory; 
remembering according to the nomadic mode 
requires composing, selecting and dosing, providing 
the conditions for deploying affirmative forces. 
Remembering the nomadic way means constantly 
searching for moments to maintain balance.
The ethics of sexual difference and the ethics 
of nomadic subjectivity are two sides of the same 
coin that Braidotti (2004) refers to the subject of 
becoming, immanent incarnate, for whom life is 
incorporated, corporatized and eroticized.
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Braidotti (2004), takes Deluze’s theory and 
Irigaray’s theory relates his theories and defines that 
subjectivity is the effect of a process, an itinerary that 
has no predetermined destination, virtual subjects to 
become. It places the universal in a transversal way 
in the uniqueness of the interrelationships between 
subjects collectively committed in the expression 
and realization of their potential this intersubjective 
space is a laboratory of becoming. Deluze and 
Irigaray agree that the subject is a body human entity 
sensitive flesh framed by skin.
It refers to the philosophy of levines and the 
Buddhaism typical of Judaism levines makes a 
defense to caress as erotic respectful contact with 
the skin of another is the basis of the haptic gaze 
(from Greek hapticus able to perceive) and the 
basis of sexual difference; and Bataille theorizes the 
idea that violence is inevitable transcendence that 
ontologically demands the consumption of the body.
The model of ethics proposed by these 
philosophies descendants of nomadism imply a 
non-hierarchical idea of transcendence this has 
implications for the notion of desire understood as 
potential.
In this case the potentia is the desire in the 
female body hood, referring to that it is at stake and 
not the feminine related to what was raised by the 
patriarchal phallogocentric code, but the feminine as 
a project, as a movement of destabilization of identity 
and therefore as becoming.  “Virtual Feminism” as 
the realization of the female powers that are at the 
margins of the dominant current, Braidotti (2004), 
connects it to the social and symbolic project of the 
redefinition of female subjectivity, adds that it is a 
common feature of the nomadic feminists who, for 
them, sexual difference is not a problem.
On the other hand, Braidotti (2009), in 
transposing death, takes the concept of pain defines 
it not only as an obstacle but also as an incentive to 
produce an ethic of change and transformation. In 
the ethics of nomadic subjects there are unhealthy 
states which kill the affirmative powers of expression 
of positive passions (Potential), that is, they are not 
sustainable and do not endure.
The ethics in this transposing are related to a new 
disembodied becoming not with new revelations, 
but to extending the thresholds of sustainability. 
Ethics is a matter of experimentation, not control 
through social alignment techniques. The ethics 
of sustainability try to turn those processes into 
productive events that broaden the meaning of life.
Finally, under this idea the limits are those of 
one’s own resistance in the sense of duration in time 
and of enduring the pain of confronting life in its 
facet of Zoe. The ethical subject is one who can 
withstand a confrontation, crack a little but without 
letting this destroy his physical or affective intensity; 
ethics consists of reworking pain and transforming 
it into Sustainability Thresholds, breaking and 
still sustaining, then Ethics is a thin sweep against 
the possibility of extinction. It is a way of making 
sustainable forms of transformation.
6. Conclusions
Ethics is an important element in the 
configuration of subjectivities, since it is through 
morality that subjects are induced to a notion of truth 
and practice in the world, through behaviors and 
behaviors determined in a global framework. That is 
why the new possibilities of ethics are framed to go in 
contrast to the ethical paradigms of universalization 
that have been perpetuated in the subject under an 
ethical basis, which induces them to commodify life 
in all its contexts, from devices that implanted in the 
lives of subjects.
However, the new looks of the ethical presuppose 
protocols that respond to practices of freedom, to the 
extent that there are other ways of thinking, saying 
and doing, from the constant configurations and 
temporal and conjunctural dynamics in the social 
environment, economic and political.
For this reason, the challenge is to make the 
discourses that constitute us, from the various 
narratives, because that is where other conceptions 
of ethics appear, since it changes the way in which 
subjectivity is configured, to the extent that new 
discourses are the ones that v constituting who we 
are.
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It is also identified that the areas of the public 
and the private have been little studied, particularly 
in the area of their linkage, particularly because 
regularly that both public and private are relatively 
recent conceptions in history, and that the discussion 
between the two areas had an eminently pragmatic-
political origin, which appear to justify the 
appearance of the State as opposed to the actions of 
civil society, when in fact both dimensions represent 
simply aspects of the same integral phenomenon in 
which the subject is framed. 
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